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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Matthew the h 
conviction for first degree stalking because the district court erred by abandoning its 
order for a competency hearing after finding reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, 
accepting Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea to first degree stalking when the court had no 
jurisdiction over that charge, and denying Mr. Pridgen's motion to withdraw his guilty 
plea even though the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary or supported by 
consideration. In response, the State argues that the court acted with its discretion 
"with respect to its determinations regarding [Mr.] Pridgen's competency" (Resp. 
Br., p.5) and when it denied his motion to withdraw his plea, and that the district court 
had jurisdiction to accept the plea because Mr. Pridgen waived his right to a preliminary 
hearing when he pied guilty. As discussed below, those arguments are unavailing. 
Further, the State has failed to dispute (or even mention) the fact that Mr. Pridgen 
should never have been bound over on battery with the intent to commit a felony in the 
first place, which means his plea was not supported by consideration and could not 
have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Because of that error alone, not to 




discretion by abandoning its order for a 
reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence? 
II. Is Mr. Pridgen's guilty plea void because the district court had no jurisdiction over 
the improperly-amended third Information charging Mr. Pridgen with first degree 
stalking? 
Ill. Did the district court abuse its discretion by denying Mr. Pridgen's motion to 




The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Abandoning Its Order For A Competency 
Evaluation After Finding Reason To Doubt Mr. Pridgen's Competence 
Idaho Code § 18-211 requires that the district court order a competency 
evaluation after finding reason to doubt a defendant's competence. The district court 
here found reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence when it ordered his competency 
evaluations, and therefore abused its discretion by abandoning its order for a 
competency evaluation and accepting Mr. Pridgen's plea without first determining 
whether he was competent. 
Without disputing that I.C. § 18-211 places a mandatory duty on the district court 
to determine whether a defendant is competence if there is reason to doubt his 
competence, the State claims that "the district court acted well within its discretion with 
respect to its determinations regarding [Mr.] Pridgen's competency." (Resp. Br., p.5 
(capitalization altered).) The State has missed the point. Mr. Pridgen does not 
challenge the determinations the district court actually made. but rather the 
determinations that the district court failed to make. After determining that there was 
reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, I.C. § 18-211 required that the court order 
an evaluation and determine either that Mr. Pridgen was or was not competent. 
I.C. § 18-211 ("Whenever there is reason to doubt the defendant's fitness to proceed" 
under I.C. § 18-210, "the court shalt order a competency evaluation to determine "the 
mental condition of the defendant to assist counsel with defense or understand the 
proceedings") (emphasis added). Instead, the district court did nothing. That inaction 
ran afoul of I.C. § 18-211. 
3 
The State's arguments to the contrary are unconvincing. First, it notes that the 
a reason doubt Mr. Pridgen's to justify the 
Br., court not found reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's 
competence, counsel wonders why else the court would have ordered a competency 
evaluation-not just once, but twice (Confidential Exs., pp.2-3; 3/31/14 Tr., p.26, L.15 -
p.28, L.21, p.30, Ls.18-22)-and why else Judge Luster would have told Mr. Pridgen 
that, if he did not cooperate with Dr. Hayes's evaluation, "I have to go through 
appointing guardians"? (3/31/14 Tr., p.29, L.25 - p.30, L.2). Second, the State's 
attempt to fault Mr. Schwartz his ''vague [sic] expressed concerns" about Mr. Pridgen's 
competency is irrelevant. (Resp. Br., p.10.) The district court found those concerns 
sufficient to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, and so the State's opinion of their 
sufficiency is beside the point. (Confidential Exs., pp.2-3; 3/31/14 Tr., p.26, L.15 -
p.28, L.21, p.30, Ls.18-22.) Finally, Mr. Wirick's representation that Mr. Schwartz 
intended to withdraw his motion for an evaluation because Dr. Hayes would not conduct 
a "piecemeal" evaluation has no bearing on the ultimate question-whether the district 
court satisfied its obligations under I.C. § 18-211 and whether Mr. Pridgen was actually 
competent to stand trial. (See Resp. Br., p.10; 5/12/14 Tr., p.19, L.20-p.20, L.4.) 
The State goes on to make its case for why Mr. Pridgen was in fact competent. 
(Resp. Br., p.10.) It argues that "there is no indication in the record that [Mr.] Pridgen 
was incompetent to stand trial or to enter a guilty plea," and then discusses evidence 
that it believes shows that Mr. Pridgen is competent. (Id.) The State fails to explain 
how there is "no indication in the record" that Mr. Pridgen was not competent, in light of 
Mr. Schwartz's declaration that he did not believe Mr. Pridgen was competent and his 
4 
to stipulate as much. (See 3/31/14 , p.5, L.16 - p.9, L.5.) Regardless, had 






State's factual claims regarding Mr. Pridgen's competence in no way make up for the 
factual findings the district court should have made. 
The district court found reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence, and there is 
nothing in the record to indicate, nor did the court find, that there was no longer any 
reason to doubt Mr. Pridgen's competence. The district court's silence violated the 
mandates of I.C. § 18-211, and in turn denied Mr. Pridgen his due process right to a fair 
trial. See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 62 (2003), reh'g on other grounds, 
140 Idaho 73 (2004). 
II 
Because The District Court Had No Jurisdiction Over The Improperly-Amended Third 
Information Charging Mr. Pridgen With First Degree Stalking, Mr. Pridgen's Guilty Plea 
Is Void 
The third amended information in this case charged Mr. Pridgen with first degree 
stalking, to which Mr. Pridgen pied guilty. First degree stalking is not a lesser included 
offense of battery with the intent to commit a serious felony, the original charge, and the 
prosecutor did not present the first degree stalking charge to the district court for a 
finding of probable cause. In fact, at the beginning of this case, the district court found 
there was no probable cause to bind over on first degree stalking. Mr. Pridgen thus 
argued in his opening brief that the district court had no jurisdiction to accept his guilty 
plea to first degree stalking, and so the plea is void. 
5 
response, the State first appears to take issue with State v. Flegel, 
5 (2011). (See Resp. 1 According to the State, Flegel 
charging is jurisdictionally invalid where the defendant was acquitted 
of the charged offense at trial and the district court allowed a post-acquittal amendment 
to a non-included offense," and "[t]hus, the jury's acquittal on the only valid charge 
against Flegel ended the district court's jurisdiction over the case." (Id.) The State's 
implication that the acquittal in Flegel had anything to do with its holding is meritless. 
Although factually correct that Flegel involved a post-acquittal amendment to an 
indictment, the Court's holding in no way turned on that fact. The Court only discussed 
Flegel's acquittal on the original charge in the factual background section. Flegel, 
151 Idaho at 526. Not once did the Court's analysis mention Flegel's acquittal, nor did 
the analysis turn on his acquittal. Instead, the holding rested on the fact that the 
amended charge had never been submitted to the grand jury. The introduction to Flegel 
stated in whole: 
This is an appeal from a conviction for the crime of sexual abuse of 
a child under sixteen years of age charged in an amended indictment. 
Because that crime had not been submitted to the grand jury and was not 
an included offense of the crime of lewd conduct charged in the original 
indictment, the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction. We 
therefore vacate the judgment of conviction and remand this case with 
instructions to dismiss the case without prejudice. 
Id. at 526. At the beginning of the analysis section, the Court summarized: 
Because Sexual Abuse is not a lesser included offense of Lewd 
Conduct, Flegel could only be validly charged by indictment with that 
crime if the matter was resubmitted to a grand jury and it returned the 
amended indictment. The prosecuting attorney had no authority to issue 
an amended indictment for a crime that was not charged in the original 
indictment and that was not an included offense of that crime. 
Id. During its analysis, the Court again reiterated that 
6 
The prosecutor had no authority to file an amended indictment charging a 
crime that was not an included offense under the original indictment, 
under either the statutory theory or the pleading theory. It is the grand 
jury, not the or the prosecutor, that must decide whether is 
probable cause to believe that Flegel committed the crime of Sexual 
Abuse. 
Id. at 530. And, finally, the Court concluded that "[n]ot having been issued by a grand 
jury, the amended indictment was invalid, the district court never had subject matter 
jurisdiction over Flegel's case regarding the charge of Sexual Abuse, and this case 
must therefore be dismissed." Id. at 531. Flegefs holding, by its own terms, did not 
turn on (or even consider) Flegel's acquittal. 
The State next argues that "[i]t is well-settled that a valid plea of guilty, voluntarily 
and understandingly given, waives all non-jurisdictional defects and defenses," and so 
Mr. Pridgen waived his right to a preliminary hearing by pleading guilty to first degree 
stalking. (Resp. Br., p.13 (citing State v. Dunlap, 123 Idaho 396, 399 (Ct App. 1993) 
and State v. Fowler, 105 Idaho 642, 643 (Ct App. 1983)1.) The State overlooks the fact 
that this is a jurisdictional defect IDAHO CONST. art. I,§ 8; Flegel, 151 Idaho at 530-31; 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 841 (2011). And because subject matter jurisdiction '"is 
so fundamental to the propriety of a court's actions ... [it] can never be waived or 
consented to."' Lute, 150 Idaho at 840 (quoting State v. Urrabazzo, 150 Idaho 158, 
163-64 (2010)). 
1 The State relies on Dunlap and Fowler to support its argument that Mr. Pridgen could 
waive jurisdiction in this case. Those cases only stand for the proposition that a guilty 
plea waives non-jurisdictional defects. See Dunlap, 123 Idaho at 399; Fowler, 105 
Idaho at 643. Although the defendants in those cases claimed defects with their 
preliminary hearings, they did not argue that the defects deprived the court of 
jurisdiction. See generally Dunlap, 123 Idaho 369; Fowler, 105 Idaho 642. 
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had no authority to amend the information, and Mr. Pridgen could not 
on 
was a nullity, 






The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Denying Mr. Pridgen's Motion To Withdraw 
His Guilty Plea Because The Plea Was Not Knowing, Intelligent, And Voluntary, and 
Was Not Supported By Valid Consideration 
Mr. Pridgen moved to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing in this case. In 
his opening brief, he argued that the district court abused its discretion by denying that 
motion because the plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary; Mr. Pridgen 
showed just reasons to withdraw his plea and the State failed to show it would suffer 
prejudice; and the plea was not supported by valid consideration. In response, the 
State flatly claims that the district court's decision was sound, without squarely 
addressing the reasons Mr. Pridgen has given to prove his plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary and that there were just reasons to withdraw his plea. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.14-19.) The State's arguments are thus unconvincing. 
The most compelling reason Mr. Pridgen should be allowed to withdraw his plea 
is that he was unlawfully bound over on a specific intent crime, battery with the intent to 
commit a serious felony, which everyone at the preliminary hearing mistakenly believed 
was a general intent crime. (8/13/2013 Tr., p.64, L.17-p.67, L.8.) Because the district 
court clearly stated that there was no specific intent-it dismissed the attempted rape 
and burglary charges for that very reason-there was no probable cause to bind 
8 
Pridgen over on battery with the intent to commit a serious felony. (8/13/201 3 
11 
disagree on point (See Resp. Br., pp.1 it 
did not even mention that point in its briefing, even though it formed the crux of 
Mr. Pridgen's argument on this issue. (See id.; App. Br., pp.23-26.) The State has thus 
failed to give any explanation as to how a plea could be knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary when the State's only bargaining chip was a felony charge which the 
defendant should never have been bound over on in the first place and which the 
defendant was clearly confused about (8/13/2014 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-23, p.13, Ls.1-8, 
p.16, L.21 - p.17, L.2, p.20, Ls.21-23.) The district court's finding that Mr. Pridgen's 
testimony at the withdrawal hearing was evasive in no way negates this fact. 
(See Resp. Br., p.18 (citing 8/13/14 Tr., p.32, L.16 - p.33, L.23).) Had the district court 
learned of this mistake before taking the plea, the State could not have charged 
Mr. Pridgen with any felony, Mr. Pridgen never would have pied guilty, and the district 
court would never have accepted this plea. 
With respect to Mr. Pridgen's claim that his plea was not supported by valid 
consideration, the State first mistakenly contends that Mr. Pridgen argued that there 
was no consideration because the court did not have jurisdiction over the third amended 
information, and then claims that its arguments on the jurisdiction issue show there was 
in fact valid consideration. (See Resp. Br., p.19.) In his opening brief, Mr. Pridgen 
referred to Section 11 in support of his argument that "there was never probable cause to 
hold Mr. Pridgen over on the battery with the intent to commit rape charge, and so [the] 
State could not fulfill the promise to 'amend' that charge down to first degree stalking in 
9 
way." (App. Br., pp.27-28.) Counsel takes partial responsibility 
II not 
over on 
Regardless, Mr. Pridgen clearly explained why there was no consideration, which 
has nothing to do with the jurisdiction issue: 
[T]here was never probable cause to hold Mr. Pridgen over on the battery 
with the intent to commit rape charge, and so that State could not fulfill the 
promise to "amend" that charge down to first degree stalking in any 
meaningful way. Moreover, the State's amendment of the battery charge 
to the felony stalking charge was undeniably the very crux of this plea 
agreement. The only consideration left in this case was the State's 
dismissal of three misdemeanor charges and possible probation 
recommendation, which no defendant would accept as consideration for a 
felony carrying a possible five-year sentence. 
(See id.) Just as in its earlier arguments regarding whether Mr. Pridgen's plea was 
knowing, intelligent, and voluntary or whether he had a just reason to withdraw his plea, 
the State has not disputed that the court should not have bound over on the battery 
charge or otherwise explained what consideration supported the plea given that error. 
The battery charge-which should never have existed-could not actually be amended 




DATED this 2nd day of December, 2015. 
'7,,z~~JLd <-<._ __ _ 
MAY~WALDRON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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